The declaration of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) last Friday in Cucuta, Colombia, on the possibility of using a preventive “military intervention”, among other options, to resolve the humanitarian and governance crisis in Venezuela caused “concern and rejection” by the majority of the governments that make up the Lima Group (GL-10): Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Santa Lucia. While Colombia, Canada, Panama and Guyana, also part of the group, abstained, they coincided with purpose in the group’s response, that is: “contributing to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela and overcoming the serious political, economic, social and humanitarian crisis that crosses [Venezuela]”.

In a dialogue of the deaf, the GL-10 “[urges] once again the Venezuelan regime to put an end to human rights violations, to free political prisoners, to respect the autonomy of the State institutions and to assume their responsibility for the serious crisis that Venezuela is experiencing today”.

The Venezuelan and Cuban regimes know that to sustain Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela after January 10, 2019 would be an uphill battle, because the Group of Lima, the United States, the European Union, and Australia did not recognize the May 20 presidential election.

According to the Venezuelan Constitution, on January 10 Maduro take an oath to the Constitution before the National Assembly or the Supreme Court of Justice in order to assume his functions as president during the 2019-2025 period. Therefore, from this day, Maduro will not have legitimacy of origin to continue in the presidency of Venezuela.

Luis Almagro’s declaration must be evaluated as included in the scenario of a restitution of the Venezuelan Constitution. The Maduro regime hasn’t had legitimacy since 2016, when the OAS Secretary-General activated the Inter-American Democratic Charter claiming the “alteration of the constitutional order that seriously affects the democratic order”.

Two years have passed since the political opposition and the democratic countries of the region sought a “peaceful and negotiated” solution to the serious crisis that Venezuela is going through. The result has been the deepening of the crisis to levels that now transcend the Venezuelan borders, in addition to the strengthening of the dictatorship, through social control of Venezuelans, and the Mafia-State.

According to the latest survey of Meganalisis “about 6 million Venezuelans would be willing to leave the country at some point, if Maduro does not leave and the crisis continues”. And since 2015, 2.3 million people have left the country, 7% according to UN figures.

Ecuador, three weeks ago, abandoned the Alba and criticized the Maduro regime “for the lack of political will to open the doors to a democratic solution”, refering to the Venezuelan migration crisis. However, before Almagro’s statement, he stated that “the international community must support the organization of a true national dialogue, transparent, democratic and with international oversight in Venezuela”.

The dialogue, so far, has been the mechanism used by Maduro to evade a “peaceful and negotiated” solution to the humanitarian and governability crisis in Venezuela, because the intension of the regime is not to solve these crises, but to maintain power at any price.

Maduro needs “the dialogue”, once more, to survive through his illegitimacy of origin after January 10, 2019. Therefore, like a “siren song”, Zapatero told the Brazilian newspaper O Globo two days ago that he “sees new conditions to restart the dialogue in Venezuela”.

With this new dialogue, aiming at a “peaceful and negotiated solution”, Maduro would seek to cross this illegitimacy threshold and win the 6 years of the oncoming presidential term. Therefore, the opposition’s abstention in the elections of 2017 and 2018 would become the largest political collective suicide in the history of Venezuela.

Once legitimized, the regime’s narrative will be that the opposition must prepare for a recall in 2022. It will be late. Social control of the population and large waves of migration will allow the dictatorship to continue until further notice.

Precisely, to avoid the deepening of the current humanitarian catastrophe and the consolidation of another dictatorship in the continent, Almagro said that all options are valid –including a military intervention- to get Maduro and his henchmen out of power. That is why he waxed his ears and tied himself to the mast of democracy to sail the sea of freedom, twisting in pain when he visited the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

So far, the actions of a “peaceful and negotiated” exit have produced the same results, the hold of Maduro on power.

With its actions, the GL-10 sin by omission and intervenes in Venezuela, maintaining the Cuban protectorate and its vassal, because the Caribbean country has been controlled by the Cuban intelligence for some time now. This reality has not generated any “concern and rejection” on the part of the GL-10.

Given the emergency situation that Venezuela is going through, a military intervention is an option that would change the course of events in the Bolivarian country. In a preventive way, it would generate the conditions to achieve the objective sought by the region, the ousting of Maduro in a democratic, peaceful and electoral way. The latest Meganalisis survey recorded that 8 out of 10 Venezuelans want a multinational humanitarian intervention.

A preventive military intervention is one of the ways to free Venezuela from the clutches of Cuba, and to restore democracy and prosperity in the South American nation.



English

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