Nicolás Maduro decided momentarily not to attend Barbados under the pretext of the executive order 13884 issued by President Donald Trump on August 5, which blocked the property of the Government of Venezuela in the United States and authorizing sanctions against natural and legal persons who carry out businesses with the Maduro regime.

Any transaction that is made in dollars or through a US bank is subject to United States legislation. Countries that carry out operations with Venezuela are under this provision, unless the company or entity has a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) that authorizes the transaction.

Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello, when they felt with their hands tied by the sanctions and without negotiation capacity (lobby of the "opposition") with the White House, opt for the sudden death of the National Assembly, sanctioning some Representatives of the political forces that support interim president, Juan Guaidó.

Consequently, Maduro with the rest of the leaders of the criminal organizations that exercise control of the state apparatus try to stop the functioning of the National Assembly - the last democratic institution left in Venezuela - so that it does not invoke Venezuelan Constitution Article 187-11, that authorizes the use of foreign military missions in the country, or request the activation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to the United Nations or American State Organization.

The progressive dismantling of the National Assembly is a hostile act against the 62 delegations that attended the International Conference for Democracy in Venezuela that took place in Lima, on August 7, which look for a peaceful exit to the Venezuela crisis.

If Maduro continuous the attack on the National Assembly it could unleash other measures on the United States diplomatic toolbox.

On August 1, Trump said he was considering a quarantine or blockade of Venezuela, as the United States steps up pressure on President Nicolas Maduro to relinquish power. He gave no details.

In 1989 and 1985, the regimes of Manuel Noriega in Panama and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua were forced to leave power after the blockade carried out by the United States. In both cases, the measure was a reaction to "the actions and policies of both regimes represented an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States".

In Panama, the reasons for the invasion were: the protection of American citizens; the defense of democracy and human rights; Noriega's detention to face drug trafficking crimes in the US; and compliance with the 1977 Torrijos-Carter treaty.

While the embargo in Nicaragua was the fight against communism, it also achieved to stop the export of armed rebellion and subversion to neighboring countries in Central America; the establishment of democracy and the rule of law; and the Application of Human Rights.

In the case of Venezuela, the same reasons applied to impose a blockade: the restoration of democracy and the defense of human rights; to stop the export of armed insurrection, terrorism, and subversion to neighboring countries in Latin America; and to defeat of drug trafficking and the mafia-State.

Therefore, Trump will have to face Maduro and Cabello as Ronald Reagan and George W. H. Bush did in Panama and Nicaragua in the 1980s. Otherwise, political, social, and economic instability in the Americas will demand such an effort that it will be late, because Maduro and Cabello seek to dissolve the only legitimate power left in Venezuela, the National Assembly, to subjugate the Bolivarian country and Latin America through the Sao Paulo Forum.

Consequently, the democratic governments of the Americas must close ranks to block the means that support the Maduro regime and the Bolivarian criminal enterprise.



English

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