“Nationalism often plays with the idea of superiority and a unique destiny, leading to exclusion and conflict. It’s a dangerous strategy that can unleash uncontrollable forces”. - Hannah Arendt

The fundamental pillars of Jorge Rodríguez’s strategy for Nicolás Maduro’s presidential reelection are social control, fragmentation of the opposition, and nationalism.

Social Control

To reconnect with the working classes, Maduro needs foreign currency for importing and distributing food in CLAP bags, paying various bonuses, and increasing the minimum wage, among other measures.

High inflation and low wages for public workers and pensioners have played a significant role in growing discontent and disapproval of Maduro’s administration. Eight out of ten Venezuelans desire political change, according to recent opinion polls.

The mechanism to obtain legitimate dollar income is exporting oil and refined products to Europe and the U.S. market. For this, lifting U.S. economic sanctions on the state-owned oil company Pdvsa is necessary.

The Barbados Agreement is crucial for injecting funds into the state’s coffers. Despite the OFAC’s stance that the reintegration of oil companies into Venezuela’s market does not directly bring foreign currency to Maduro’s regime, this is not entirely accurate. Joint ventures contribute taxes, royalties, and dividends to the state and Pdvsa. Last month alone, these companies generated an estimated $619 million, according to Inter-American Trends.

An indicator of increased foreign exchange in the Venezuelan market is the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the Bolívar. Following the agreement’s signing, the devaluation of the national currency has shown a slowing trend, as per data from the Central Bank of Venezuela.

Therefore, the strategy to increase the regime’s coffers to make Maduro a competitive candidate in the next presidential election depends on whether the dictatorship betrays or adheres to the Barbados Agreement. Incidentally, it has until next week to demonstrate its commitment to the pact.

Nationalism

Rodríguez’s other strategy is nationalism, based on stirring a shared national identity feeling, focusing on the Esequibo claim area, threatened by the Guyanese government and Exxon. The strategy involves a consultative referendum aimed at unifying the country around Maduro, given his significant decline in popularity and María Corina Machado’s rise as the democratic forces’ leader after the primary.

However, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) firmly supports Guyana, emphasizing inviolable borders and resolving disputes through the International Court of Justice.

Moreover, actions by countries like China and Brazil in the Esequibo territory continue, directly impacting Venezuela’s relations with these powers. Key infrastructure projects like the highway linking Manaus with Georgetown indicate how regional geopolitics evolves independently of Venezuela’s actions.

International actors like Caricom and the stances of China and Brazil suggest that the Esequibo debate and Maduro’s regime policies could affect its position and perception internationally.

Therefore, the nationalism strategy seeks a pretext for transitioning from authoritarianism to a state of national and external shock. Under the guise of protecting the “higher interest of the nation”, individual freedoms could be further restricted, and the 2024 presidential elections could be postponed to 2025 if Maduro’s popularity does not guarantee electoral victory. A military incursion into the Esequibo by the National Bolivarian Armed Forces should be considered carefully.

Consequently, with the December 3 consultative referendum, Madurism faces a situation with no clear outcomes. By presenting popular participation as a triumph and validating its five questions, the regime seeks political justification to postpone the presidential election until the first half of 2025, turning it into a mega-election including governorships, mayoralties, and parliamentary seats. This nationalism faces a false sense of patriotism that could lead to disaster. Argentina’s history with the Falkland Islands offers a clear lesson: underestimating international response and clinging to extreme nationalism resulted in both military and political failure.

Fragmented Opposition

After the primary did not yield the expected result, the strategy to fragment the opposition shifted to 2024. The regime seeks to weaken María Corina Machado’s leadership with the other two mentioned strategies: social control and nationalism.

Conclusion

Maduro faces over 80% widespread rejection, and international pressure is mounting for free and verifiable elections in 2024. Caricom’s potentially hostile stance towards Venezuela, the reversal of essential licenses by the Biden administration, and the demoralization of the Armed Forces further complicate the country’s political landscape.

In addition to political and military challenges, Maduro’s regime faces a complex economic and geopolitical situation. The dependency on revenues from oil and refined product exports, fluctuations in international markets, and regional and global tensions directly influence the regime’s stability. Foreign actors’ involvement in the Esequibo, especially regarding natural resource exploration, is a factor that must be considered.

Madurism finds itself at a complex crossroads in its attempt to strengthen its position through a referendum on the Esequibo. The regime’s decisions and actions will determine the course of domestic politics and influence its position on the international stage. In this context, Jorge Rodríguez must reconsider his strategy and seek solutions that promote a democratic exit from the crisis and respect for international law, avoiding the pitfalls of betraying the Barbados Agreement, excessive nationalism, and hasty actions that could have disastrous consequences for both the country and the region. Remember that famous anonymous quote: “The collective strength of a people is like a river in flood; once it rises, it flows with a power that nothing can contain”.

Argentina has just demonstrated this. The crude fear campaign against Milei could not overcome the majority’s aspirations. The same could happen in Venezuela. A simple truth lies in the people’s hearts: they are united in their desire for change. Thus, no nationalism, social control, or fragmentation of democratic forces can withstand their will.



English

Latest publications
Trump 2.0 vs Maduro: negociar o perder
Politics, 12/Nov/2024
Venezuela ante un triunfo de Kamala o Trump
Politics, 5/Nov/2024
Elección estadounidense: una guerra de valores
Politics, 31/Oct/2024
El aislamiento de Maduro
Politics, 29/Oct/2024
Maduro y la estrategia de poder bajo fuego
Politics, 22/Oct/2024
Es hora de elegir la soberanía popular
Politics, 21/Oct/2024
Venezuela en un equilibrio inestable
Politics, 1/Oct/2024
A dos meses del triunfo de la soberanía popular
Politics, 27/Sep/2024
La coordinación es la clave para el cambio en Venezuela
Breaking Venezuela’s stalemate: strategic coordination to overcome Maduro’s regime
Politics, 24/Sep/2024
Chevron y Biden-Harris ante el dilema de mantener a Maduro
Chevron and Biden-Harris: the dilemma of keeping Maduro in power
Politics, 17/Sep/2024
Represión vs. Resistencia latente
Venezuela’s turning point: breaking the cycle of repression
Politics, 10/Sep/2024
La guerra silenciosa en Venezuela: un juego de estrategia al límite
Politics, 10/Sep/2024
En Venezuela, la inacción no es una opción
Politics, 28/Aug/2024
Más allá de las negociaciones, el rol de la comunidad internacional
Politics, 25/Aug/2024
Democracia y justicia ante el régimen criminal de Miraflores
Politics, 16/Aug/2024
El desafío democrático en Venezuela
The democratic challenge in Venezuela
Politics, 10/Aug/2024
Latest events
Children of Misery: Guns and Gangs in Central America
Hudson Institute - Center for Latin American Studies
September 10, 2014
Beyond Hugo Chávez: What to expect in Latin America
Hudson Institute - Center for Latin American Studies
May 8, 2013
XIV Seminario de Estrategias de Campañas Electorales - De la práctica a la práctica
The George Washington University - The Graduate School of Political Management
March 11 to 15, 2013